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Abstract. We investigate the following problem: given a set of jobs and a set of
people with preferences over the jobs, what is the optimal way of matching people
to jobs? Here we consider the notion of popularity. A matching M is popular if
there is no matching M′ such that more people prefer M′ to M than the other way
around. Determining whether a given instance admits a popular matching and, if
so, finding one, was studied in [2]. If there is no popular matching, a reasonable
substitute is a matching whose unpopularity is bounded. We consider two mea-
sures of unpopularity - unpopularity factor denoted by u(M) and unpopularity
margin denoted by g(M). McCutchen recently showed that computing a match-
ing M with the minimum value of u(M) or g(M) is NP-hard, and that if G does
not admit a popular matching, then we have u(M)≥ 2 for all matchings M in G.
Here we show that a matching M that achieves u(M) = 2 can be computed in
O(m
√
n) time (where m is the number of edges in G and n is the number of
nodes) provided a certain graph H admits a matching that matches all people. We
also describe a sequence of graphs: H = H2,H3, . . . ,Hk such that if Hk admits
a matching that matches all people, then we can compute in O(km
√
n) time a
matching M such that u(M) ≤ k− 1 and g(M) ≤ n(1− 2k ). Simulation results
suggest that our algorithm finds a matching with low unpopularity.
1 Introduction
The problem of assigning people to positions is a very common problem that
arises in many domains. The input here is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪P ,E),
where nodes on one side of the bipartite graph rank edges incident on them
in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. That is, the edge set E is
partitioned into E1 ∪˙E2 . . . ∪˙Er. We call A the set of applicants, P the set of
posts, and Ei the set of edges with rank i. If (a, p) ∈ Ei and (a, p′) ∈ E j with
i < j, we say that a prefers p to p′. If i = j, then a is indifferent between p and
p′. The ordering of posts adjacent to a is called a’s preference list. The problem
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is to assign applicants to posts that is optimal with respect to these preference
lists.
This problem has been well-studied in economics literature, see for example
[3, 13, 15]. It models some important real-world markets, including the alloca-
tion of graduates to training positions [7], families to government-owned hous-
ing [14], mail-based DVD rental systems such as NetFlix. Instances of these
markets are can be regarded as restricted stable marriage instances [4, 6], in
which members of one side of the market (posts) are indifferent between mem-
bers of the other side of the market (applicants).
A matching M of G is a subset of E, such that no two edges of M share a
common endpoint. Various criteria have been proposed to measure the “good-
ness” of a matching. For example, a matching is Pareto-optimal [1, 3, 13] if no
applicant can improve his/her allocation (say by exchanging posts with another
applicant) without requiring some other applicant to be worse off. There are
many Pareto-optimal matchings and so we need stronger definitions: a match-
ing is rank-maximal [8] if it allocates the maximum number of applicants to
their first choice, and then subject to this, the maximum number to their second
choice, and so on. Such a matching has the lexicographically maximum tuple
(n1,n2, . . .) where ni is the number of people assigned to positions they respec-
tively rank i-th. A matching is maximum utility if it maximizes ∑(a,p)∈M ua,p,
where ua,p is the utility of allocating post p to applicant a. Note that ua,p would
be a function of the numerical rank that a associates with the edge (a, p). Thus
most of these criteria use the actual values or numerical ranks expressed by
applicants in their preference lists. Such criteria are easily prone to manipu-
lation by people lying about their preferences. Moreover, the preference lists
only express the “relative” ranking of the options. Measuring the optimality of a
matching as a function of the actual numerical ranks may not be the correct ap-
proach. One criterion that does not use numerical ranks is popularity. We define
it below.
We say that an applicant a prefers matching M′ to M if (i) a is matched in
M′ and unmatched in M, or (ii) a is matched in both M′ and M, and a prefers
M′(a) to M(a) (where M(a),M′(a) are the posts that a is matched to in M and
in M′, respectively).
Definition 1. M′ is more popular than M, denoted by M′ ≻ M, if the number of
applicants that prefer M′ to M is greater than the number of applicants prefer-
ring M to M′. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M′ that is more
popular than M.
Figure 1 contains an example instance in whichA = {a1,a2,a3}, P = {p1, p2, p3},
and each applicant prefers p1 to p2, and p2 to p3. Consider the three symmet-
rical matchings M1 = {(a1, p1), (a2, p2), (a3, p3)}, M2 = {(a1, p3), (a2, p1),
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(a3, p2)} and M3 = {(a1, p2), (a2, p3), (a3, p1)}. None of these matchings is
popular, since M1 ≺ M2, M2 ≺ M3, and M3 ≺ M1. In fact, it turns out that this
instance admits no popular matching, the problem being that the more popular
than relation is not transitive.
a1 : p1 p2 p3
a2 : p1 p2 p3
a3 : p1 p2 p3
Fig. 1. An instance for which there is no popular matching.
The popular matching problem is to determine if a given instance admits a
popular matching, and to find such a matching, if one exists. The first polynomial-
time algorithms for this problem were given in [2]: when there are no ties in the
preference lists, the problem can be solved in O(n+m) time, where n = |A∪P |
and m = |E|, and more generally, the problem can be solved in O(m√n) time.
The main drawback of the notion of popular matchings is that such matchings
may not exist in the given graph. In this situation, it would be desirable if we
can find some good substitutes of a popular matching. This motivates our paper.
1.1 Problem Definition
In this paper, we assume that the input instance G does not admit a popular
matching. Our goal is to compute a least unpopular matching. We use two cri-
teria given by McCutchen [11] to measure the unpopularity of a matching. We
first need the following definitions.
Given any two matchings X and Y in G, define φ(X ,Y ) = number of appli-
cants that prefer X to Y . Let us define the following functions to compare two
matchings X and Y :
∆(X ,Y ) =


φ(Y,X)/φ(X ,Y ) if φ(X ,Y ) > 0
1 if φ(X ,Y ) = 0 and φ(Y,X) = 0
∞ otherwise.
and δ(X ,Y ) = φ(Y,X)−φ(X ,Y ).
Having the above functions, we can define the unpopularity factor of a
matching M as:
u(M) = max
M′
∆(M,M′).
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The unpopularity margin of a matching M is defined as:
g(M) = max
M′
δ(M,M′).
The functions u(·) and g(·) were first introduced by McCutchen, who also
gave polynomial time algorithms to compute u(M) and g(M) for any given
matching M. A matching M is popular if and only if u(M) = 1 and g(M) = 0.
When G does not admit popular matchings, we are interested in computing a
matching M with a low value of u(M). Suppose u(M)≤ 2. Then such a match-
ing can be considered “reasonably popular” in a model where we say that a
matching M′ beats another matching M only when the number of applicants
who prefer M′ to M is more than twice the number of applicants who prefer M
to M′. If u(M)≤ 2, then no other matching can beat M by the above rule. Note
that all the 3 matchings M1,M2,M3 described in Figure 1 have their u value
equal to 2 and their g value equal to 1. Let us now define a least unpopular
matching.
Definition 2. A matching M which achieves the minimum value of u(M) among
all the matchings in G is defined as the least unpopularity factor matching in
G. Similarly, a matching that achieves the minimum value of g(M) among all
matchings in G is defined as the least unpopularity margin matching in G.
McCutchen recently showed that either computing a least unpopularity fac-
tor matching or a least unpopularity margin matching is NP-hard. He also showed
that the unpopularity factor of any matching is always an integer. Thus when G
does not admit a popular matching, the best matching in terms of the unpopu-
larity factor that one can hope for in G is a matching M that satisfies u(M) = 2.
Complementing McCutchen’s results, we have the following new results here.
• A least unpopularity factor matching can be computed in O(m√n) time pro-
vided a certain graph H admits an A-complete matching. An A-complete
matching means all nodes in A are matched. Such a matching M that we
compute in H satisfies u(M) = 2.
• We also show a more general result. We construct a sequence of graphs:
H = H2,H3, . . . ,Hk, . . . and show that if Hk admits an A-complete matching,
then we can compute in O(km
√
n) time a matching M such that u(M)≤ k−1
and g(M)≤ n(1− 2k ).
• We ran our algorithm on random graphs using a similar setup as in [2]. Our
simulation results suggest that when G is a random graph, then for values
of k ≤ 4, we see that Hk admits an A-complete matching. Thus in these
graphs our algorithm computes a matching M whose unpopularity factor is
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a number≤ 3 and whose unpopularity margin can be upper bounded by n/2.
We also give a probabilistic analysis to upperbound the performance of our
algorithm.
1.2 Background and Related Results
The notion of popular matchings was first introduced by Gardenfors [5] in the
context of the stable marriage problem. It is well known that every stable mar-
riage instance admits a weakly stable matching (one for which there is no pair
who strictly prefer each other to their partners in the matching). In fact, there
can be an exponential number of weakly stable matchings, and so Gardenfors
considered the problem of finding one with additional desirable properties, such
as popularity. Gardenfors showed that when preference lists are strictly ordered,
every stable matching is popular. He also showed that when preference lists
contain ties, there may be no popular matching.
When only one side has preferences, Abraham et al. [2] gave polynomial
time algorithms to find a popular matching, or to report none exists. Recently,
Mahdian [9] showed that a popular matching exists with high probability, when
(i) preference lists are randomly constructed, and (ii) the number of posts is a
factor of α ≈ 1.42 larger than the number of applicants. He in fact showed a
phase transition at α, that is, if the number of posts is smaller than α times the
number of applicants, then with high probability popular matchings do not exist.
Manlove and Sng [10] generalized the algorithms of [2] to the case where
each post has an associated capacity, the number of applicants that it can accom-
modate. (They described this in the equivalent context of the house allocation
problem.) They gave an O(√Cn1 + m) time algorithm for the no-ties case, and
an O((
√
C +n1)m) time algorithm when ties are allowed, where n1 is the num-
ber of applicants, m, as usual, is the total length of all preference lists, and C is
the total capacity of all of the posts.
In [12] Mestre designed an efficient algorithm for the weighted popular
matching problem, where each applicant is assigned a priority or weight, and
the definition of popularity takes into account the priorities of the applicants. In
this case his algorithm for the no-ties version has O(n +m) complexity, and for
the version that allows ties, the complexity is O(min(k
√
n,n)m), where k is the
number of distinct weights assigned to applicants.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we describe the popular matching al-
gorithm from [2], which is the starting point of our algorithm. We then describe
McCutchen’s algorithm to compute the unpopularity factor of a given matching.
In Section 3 we describe our algorithm and bound its unpopularity factor and
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unpopularity margin. In Section 4 we report our experimental results. Section 5
presents a probabilistic analysis of our algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the algorithmic characterization of popular matchings
given in [2] and the algorithm to compute the unpopularity index of a matching
as given by McCutchen.
For exposition purposes, we create a unique strictly-least-preferred post l(a)
for each applicant a. In this way, we can assume that every applicant is matched,
since any unmatched applicant a can be paired with l(a). From now on, match-
ings are always A-complete. Also, without loss of generality, we assume that
preference lists contain no gaps, i.e., if a is incident to an edge of rank i, then a
is incident to an edge of rank i−1, for all i > 1.
Let H1 = (A ∪P ,E1) be the graph containing only rank-one edges. Then
[2, Lemma 3.1] shows that a matching M is popular in G only if M ∩E1 is a
maximum matching of H1. Maximum matchings have the following important
properties, which we use throughout the rest of the paper.
M∩E1 defines a partition of A ∪P into three disjoint sets: a node u∈A∪P
is even (resp. odd) if there is an even (resp. odd) length alternating path in H1
(w.r.t. M∩E1) from an unmatched node to u. Similarly, a node u is unreachable
if there is no alternating path from an unmatched node to u. Denote by N , O
andU the sets of even, odd, and unreachable nodes, respectively.
Lemma 1 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition). Let N , O and U be the sets of
nodes defined by H1 and M∩E1 above. Then
(a) N , O andU are pairwise disjoint, and independent of the maximum match-
ing M∩E1.
(b) In any maximum matching of H1, every node in O is matched with a node in
N , and every node in U is matched with another node in U. The size of a
maximum matching is |O|+ |U|/2.
(c) No maximum matching of H1 contains an edge between a node in O and a
node in O ∪U. Also, H1 contains no edge between a node in N and a node
in N ∪U.
Using this node partition, we make the following definitions: for each appli-
cant a, f (a) is the set odd/unreachable posts amongst a’s most-preferred posts.
Also, s(a) is the set of a’s most-preferred posts amongst all even posts. We re-
fer to posts in ∪a∈A f (a) as f -posts and posts in ∪a∈As(a) as s-posts. Note that
f -posts and s-posts are disjoint, and that s(a) 6= /0 for any a, since l(a) is always
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even. Also note that there may be posts in P that are neither f -posts nor s-posts.
The next theorem characterizes the set of all popular matchings.
Theorem 1 ([2]). A matching M is popular in G iff (i) M∩E1 is a maximum
matching of H1 = (A∪P ,E1), and (ii) for each applicant a, M(a)∈ f (a)∪s(a).
Figure 2 contains the algorithm from [2], based on Theorem 1, for solving
the popular matching problem.
Popular-Matching(G = (A ∪P ,E))
Construct the graph G′ = (A ∪P ,E ′), where E ′ = {(a, p) : a ∈ A and p ∈ f (a)∪ s(a)}.
Construct a maximum matching M of H1 = (A ∪P ,E1).
//Note that M is also a matching in G′.
Remove any edge in G′ between a node in O and a node in O ∪U.
//No maximum matching of H1 contains such an edge.
Augment M in G′ until it is a maximum matching of G′.
Return M if it is A-complete, otherwise return “no popular matching”.
Fig. 2. An O(
√
nm)-time algorithm for the popular matching problem (from [2]).
2.1 McCutchen’s algorithm
Here we outline the algorithm given by McCutchen for computing the unpopu-
larity factor of a matching. Given a matching M, the idea is to find a series of
promotions (of applicants) at the cost of demoting one applicant. The longest
such promotion path determines the unpopularity factor of the particular match-
ing. Such a path can be discovered by building a directed weighted graph on
the set of posts. We will refer to this graph as the Posts-Graph GP . The vertices
of GP represent all the posts P in the original graph. We add edges into GP
based on the following rules: (let M(p) denote the applicant to which post p is
matched to in the matching M)
– an edge with weight −1 is directed from post pi to p j if M(pi) prefers p j to
pi.
– an edge with weight 0 is directed from post pi to p j if M(pi) is indifferent
between pi and p j.
Note that there is no edge from pi to p j if M(pi) prefers pi to p j. The series
of promotions mentioned above is a negative weight path in this graph. To find
the longest negative weight path in this graph, we add a dummy vertex s with 0
weight edges from s to all posts. An algorithm which finds shortest paths from
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source s to all posts will give the longest negative weight path in GP . Existence
of a negative weight cycle implies that there exists a promotion sequence with-
out any demotion and hence the unpopularity factor of the matching is ∞. Let us
assume that no negative weight cycles exist. Then all posts have a 0 or negative
weight shortest path from the source. The post whose distance from the source
is the “most negative” determines the unpopularity index of the matching M.
For details of the proof of correctness, refer to [11].
3 Our algorithm
In this section we describe a greedy strategy to compute a matching of G, whose
unpopularity can be bounded. Our algorithm is iterative and in every iteration it
constructs a graph Hi and a maximum matching Mi in Hi. We show that if Mi is
an A-complete matching, then u(Mi)≤ i−1 and g(Mi)≤ n(1−2/i).
We will first give some intuition before we formally describe our algorithm.
Recall that the popular matching algorithm first finds a maximum cardinality
matching M1 in the graph H1 (whose edge set is the set of all rank 1 edges). The
algorithm then identifies all even applicants/posts using the Gallai-Edmonds de-
composition and adds the edges (a, p) where a is even and p∈ s(a) to the pruned
graph H1 (all rank 1 edges between an odd node in H1 and a node that is odd
or unreachable in H1 are removed from H1). Note that each such edge (a, p) is
new to H1, that is, such an edge is not already present in H1 since by Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition (part (iii)), there is no edge between two even vertices
of H1, and here both a and p are even in H1. In this new graph, call it H2, M1 is
augmented to a maximum cardinality matching M2. In case M2 is A-complete,
we declare that the instance admits a popular matching. Otherwise no popular
matching exists.
The idea of our algorithm here is an extension of the same strategy. Since
we are considering instances which do not admit a popular matching, M2 found
above will not be A-complete. In this case, we go further and find the Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition of nodes in H2 and identify nodes that are even in
H1 and in H2. A node that is odd or unreachable in either H1 or in H2 will
always be matched by a maximum cardinality matching in H2 that is obtained
by augmenting a maximum cardinality matching in H1. Hence the nodes that
are not guaranteed to be matched by such a matching M2 are the applicants and
posts that are even in both H1 and H2.
So let us now add the edges (a, p) to H2 where a and p are nodes that are
even in both H1 and H2 and among all posts that are even in both H1 and H2,
p is a most preferred post of a. We would again like to point out that such an
edge (a, p) did not exist in either H1 or in H2, since a and p were even in H1
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and in H2. We also prune H2 to remove edges that are contained in no maximum
cardinality matching of H2 and call the resulting graph H3. We then augment
M2 to get M3 and continue the same procedure till we finally get an A-complete
matching Mi.
We would now like to contrast our approach above with the approach used in
the algorithm for rank-maximal matchings [8]. In the i-th iteration the algorithm
for rank-maximal matchings would add edges from an applicant a that is even in
each of the previous iterations to a post p that was even in each of the previous
iterations if and only if p was a rank i post in a’s preference list. On the other
hand, our algorithm will add an edge from an applicant a that is even in each of
the previous iterations to a post q that is even in each of the previous iterations if
q is a’s most preferred post among all such posts. Note that the rank of the edge
(a,q) is not necessarily i. Thus the absolute ranks in the preference lists are not
important and instead, what is important here is the relative ordering of posts
in each applicant’s preference list. Thus unlike in the rank-maximal matching
algorithm, in our algorithm every applicant a that has been even in all previous
iterations will have some new edge incident on it in the i-th iteration.
With the above intuition, we are now ready to formally define the algorithm.
3.1 The algorithm
We start with H1 = (A ∪P ,E1) where E1 is the set of rank 1 edges. Let M1 be
any maximum cardinality matching in H1.
Initialize i = 1 and let all nodes be unmarked.
While Mi is not A-complete do:
1. Partition the nodes of A ∪P into three disjoint sets: Ni,Oi,Ui.
– Ni and Oi consists of nodes that can be reached in Hi from an unmatched node
by an even/odd length alternating path with respect to Mi, respectively.
– Ui consists of nodes that are unreachable by an alternating path from any un-
matched node in Hi.
2. Mark all unmarked nodes in Oi∪Ui.
3. Delete all edges of Hi between a node in Oi and a node in Oi∪Ui
4. Add edges (a, p) to Hi where (i) a in unmarked, (ii) p is unmarked and (iii) p is a’s
most preferred post among all unmarked posts. Call the resulting graph Hi+1.
5. Augment Mi in Hi+1 to get a new matching Mi+1 which is a maximum cardinality
matching of Hi+1.
6. i = i+1.
Fig. 3. An O(km
√
n)-time algorithm for finding an A–complete matching.
We note that once a post becomes odd or unreachable in any iteration, it gets
marked and hence it cannot get new edges incident upon it in the subsequent
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iterations. We use this to show that the unpopularity factor of the matching that
we produce is bounded by k−1 if we find an A-complete matching in the graph
Hk. The running time of our algorithm is determined by the least k such that
Hk admits an A-complete matching. Since each iteration of our algorithm takes
O(m
√
n) time, the overall running time is O(km
√
n), where k is the least number
such that Hk admits an A-complete matching.
Before we prove our main theorems, we need the following definition that
defines a level j post for an applicant a. A level 1 post for each applicant is just
its rank 1 post. But from levels ≥ 2, a level j post for an applicant need not be
its rank j post.
Definition 3. A level j post for an applicant a is a post p such that (i) p is an
even post in H1, . . . ,H j−1 and (ii) p is the most preferred post for a amongst all
such posts.
Theorem 2. If our algorithm finds an A-complete matching Mk in Hk, then
u(Mk)≤ k−1.
Proof. Let Mk be the A-complete matching produced by our algorithm after k
iterations. We draw the posts graph GP corresponding to the matching Mk. The
unpopularity index of Mk is the “most negative” distance of a vertex (post) in
GP from the dummy source s as described in Section 2. We now show that the
posts in GP can be partitioned into k layers (corresponding to the k iterations)
such that all negative weight edges always go from higher numbered layers to
lower numbered layers. If we show this, then it is clear that since there are only
k layers and all negative weight edges have weight −1, the longest negative
weight path can be of length at most k−1.
Let us partition the posts of GP such that a post belongs to a layer t if it gets
marked for the first time in iteration t. Let p be a post that belongs to level i.
Recall that in GP there is a negative weight edge from p to q iff Mk(p) strictly
prefers q to p. We now show that any such post q should belong to a layer j such
that j < i.
First, note that an edge (a, p) is added to the graph at the end of the ( j−1)-
th iteration of our algorithm (for any j ≥ 1) only if p is a level j post for a. Next,
note that since p got marked in the i-th iteration, no new edges are ever added to
p in any of the subsequent iterations. Based on these two observations, we can
conclude that since the edge (Mk(p), p) exists in GP it has to be the case that p
is a level ℓ post for Mk(p) for some ℓ≤ i.
That is, at the end of the (ℓ− 1)-th iteration, p was the most preferred un-
marked post for Mk(p). Hence all the posts that Mk(p) strictly prefers to p were
already marked before/during the (ℓ−1)th iteration. That is, these posts belong
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to layers j, where j ≤ ℓ−1 ≤ i−1. Thus if (p,q) is a negative weight edge out
of p, then q belongs to layer j, where j < i.
Hence we have shown that all negative weight edges must go from higher
numbered layers to lower numbered layers. This implies that the longest nega-
tive weight path in the graph GP corresponding to Mk is at most k−1. In other
words, u(Mk)≤ k−1. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. If our algorithm finds an A-complete matching Mk in Hk, then
g(Mk)≤ n(1− 2k ).
Proof. Let Mk be the A-complete matching produced by our algorithm after k
iterations and let M be any other A-complete matching in G. Now let us con-
struct a weighted directed graph HP similar to the posts graph GP . The vertices
of HP are all posts p such that Mk(p) 6= M(p). For every applicant a we have
a directed edge from Mk(a) to M(a) with a weight of −1,0,+1 if a considers
M(a) better than, the same as or worse than Mk(a). Any post p that does not
belong to HP is matched to the same applicant in Mk as well as in M and hence
the corresponding applicant does not contribute to the unpopularity margin. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that the sum of weights of all edges in HP gives the negative
of the unpopularity margin by which M dominates Mk.
First note that HP is a set of disjoint paths and cycles. This is because, HP
can equivalently be constructed from S = Mk⊕M by striking off applicants and
giving appropriate directions and weights to edges. Thus a path in S continues
to be a path in HP although it may no longer be of even length. The same is
true for cycles also. If a path or cycle consists of only 0 weight edges, then we
can drop such a cycle/path from the graph, since these edges do not contribute
to the unpopularity margin. In addition, note that any cycle or path cannot be
composed of only negative and zero weight edges, otherwise the unpopularity
factor of Mk is ∞, a contradiction. Hence we can assume that every cycle or path
contains at least one positive edge.
Let ρ be any path or cycle in HP . Furthermore, let α and β be the numbers
of −1’s and +1’s in ρ respectively. We define the function:
frac-margin(ρ) = α−β
number of edges in ρ
Let us try to bound frac-margin(ρ) for each ρ. For the sake of simplicity, let
us first assume that the preference lists are strict. So there are only ±1 weight
edges in HP . Thus frac-margin(ρ) = (α− β)/(α + β). Since the unpopularity
factor of Mk is bounded by k− 1, it is easy to see that the unpopularity factor
of ρ is also bounded by k−1 (refer to [11] for a proof), implying α/β ≤ k−1.
Thus β/(α+β)≥ 1/k, and α/(α+β)≤ 1−1/k. Hence frac-margin(ρ) for any
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path or cycle ρ is at most 1− 2/k. The contribution of ρ towards δ(Mk,M) is
(number of edges in ρ)·(frac-margin(ρ)). This is at most nρ(1−2/k) where nρ
is the number of edges in ρ. Since a unique applicant a is associated with each
edge (Mk(a),M(a)) of HP , it follows that ∑nρ ≤ n. Thus δ(Mk,M)≤ n(1−2/k)
where M is any matching.
The proof for the case with ties also follows from the above argument.
Since 0 weight edges in ρ do not affect the numerator of frac-margin(ρ) and
only increase the denominator of frac-margin(ρ), it is easy to see that frac-
margin(ρ) for a path or cycle ρ with 0 weight edges is dominated by frac-
margin(ρ′) where ρ′ is obtained from ρ by contracting 0 weight edges. Thus
frac-margin(ρ) ≤ 1− 2/k and thus δ(Mk,M) ≤ n(1− 2/k) where M is any
matching. Thus maxM′δ(Mk,M)≤ n(1−2/k). ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let G be a graph that does not admit a popular matching. If our
algorithm produces an A-complete matching M in H3, then M is a least unpop-
ularity factor matching in G.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2 that if our algorithm produces an applicant
complete matching M in H3, then u(M) ≤ 2. McCutchen [11] showed that the
unpopularity factor of any matching is always an integer. Thus if G admits no
popular matching, then the lowest value of u(·) we can hope for is 2. Since
u(M)≤ 2, it follows that this is a least unpopularity factor matching. ⊓⊔
a1 : p1 p8 · · ·
a2 : p2 p9 · · ·
a3 : p3 p10 · · ·
a4 : p4 p1 · · ·
a5 : p4 p1 p5 p6 p7 · · ·
a6 : p4 p2 p5 p6 p7 · · ·
a7 : p4 p3 p5 p6 p7 · · ·
Fig. 4. All preference lists are strictly-ordered.
Starting with the above corollary, it is tempting to push the frontier fur-
ther. Suppose that the algorithm gets an A-complete matching M4 in the graph
H4 (thus u(M4) ≤ 3). Can we also argue that it is impossible to achieve a bet-
ter matching? Unfortunately, this is not the case. In the example given in Fig-
ure 4, we show a problem instance, where our algorithm terminates in construct-
ing M4 = {(a1, p1),(a2, p2),(a3, p3),(a4, p4), (a5, p5),(a6, p6),(a7, p7)} in H4.
However, the matching M∗ = {(a1, p8),(a2, p9),(a3, p10),(a5, p1), (a6, p2),
(a7, p3), (a4, p4)} does achieve u(M∗) = 2.
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n = 100
# rounds
k t 2 3 4
0.05 4 996
0.2 28 972
10 0.5 471 529
0.8 729 271
1.0 1000
0.05 991 9
0.2 3 991 6
25 0.5 138 861 1
0.8 773 227
1.0 1000
0.05 948 52
0.2 1 978 21
50 0.5 158 832 10
0.8 793 207
1.0 1000
0.05 952 48
0.2 2 973 25
100 0.5 148 836 16
0.8 783 217
1.0 1000
n = 500
# rounds
k t 2 3 4
0.05 1000
0.2 1000
10 0.5 176 824
0.8 62 938
1.0 1000
0.05 1000
0.2 1000
25 0.5 999 1
0.8 93 907
1.0 1000
0.05 967 33
0.2 994 6
50 0.5 997 3
0.8 104 896
1.0 1000
0.05 828 172
0.2 942 58
100 0.5 989 11
0.8 93 907
1.0 1000
n # rounds
2 3 4
10 585 413 2
25 141 844 15
50 6 962 32
100 952 48
250 896 104
500 820 180
1000 667 333
1500 541 459
2000 320 680
Table 1. The left and middle tables show the number of instances with n = 100 and 500 nodes
respectively (out of a 1000 instances) that finish in round number 2 (popular matching), 3 or 4 for
different values of the parameters k and t. The table on the right shows the number of instances
(out of a 1000 instances) that finish in round number 2 (popular matching), 3 or 4 for fixed
t = 0.05, k = n and different values of the parameter n.
It is easy to extend the above instance by adding applicants and posts so that
the greedy algorithm takes as large number of iterations as desired even when
the instance admits a matching with u(M) = 2.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we present simulation results showing that our algorithm is able
to find a matching with small unpopularity.
We follow the setting used in [2] so that our experimental results are com-
parable to those reported in [2]. The number of applicants and posts are equal
(denoted by n) and preference lists have the same length k. Existence of ties is
characterized by a single parameter t which denotes the probability of an entry
in the preference list to be tied with its predecessor.
Table 1 contains simulation results for random graphs with n = 100 and
n = 500 for different values of parameters k and t. The table shows the number
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of instances (out of 1000 instances) that finish in some particular round of the
execution. Round 2 means that the instance has a popular matching. It is easy to
observe that the difficult cases are the ones where we only have a few ties (t is
small). For a fixed value of k as t decreases the algorithm requires more rounds
until it returns a solution. However, the good news are that it never takes more
than four rounds.
As Table 1 suggests, the difficult situation is when k is large (roughly n)
and t is very small (the preferences have few ties and these ties are of small
length). We study this situation further by varying the value of n in order to see
whether our observations for n = 100 and n = 500 are valid for larger values
of n. Let us remark that Mahdian [9] proved the following result. If the right
side of the bipartite partition is slightly larger than (≈ 1.42 times) the left side,
then the instance has a popular matching with high probability. Since we try to
identify difficult instances we keep the two sides of the partition equal, which is
also the case in many practical situations, where there are no surplus posts when
compared to the number of applicants.
Table 1 shows the number of rounds (again out of a 1000) that is required for
different values of n when t = 0.05 and k = n, i.e., the graph is complete bipartite
and there only a few ties of very small length exist. The table suggests that as n
increases the probability of terminating at the second or third round decreases
while the one of the 4th round increases. However, this is not accompanied with
any increase in rounds larger than 4. Due to memory constraints we could not
continue the experiment for larger values of n, but we conjecture that for larger
values of n all instances will terminate in round 4.
Our experimental results are very promising. The algorithm behaves nicely
in practice, far away from a possible large approximation.
5 A bound on the number of iterations taken by our algorithm
In this section we probabilistically bound the number of iterations our algorithm
takes to compute an A-complete matching. We show that, on random instances,
the expected number of iterations taken by our algorithm is at most ⌈lnn⌉. In
this section, we assume that each preference list is complete and has no ties in
it. Each preference list is a uniform random permutation on the set of all posts.
We also assume that the number of applicants is equal to the number of posts,
and let us call this number n.
We now describe our random experiment. Each applicant picks a permuta-
tion independently and uniformly at random from the set of all permutations on
the posts. For the sake of analysis, we view the experiment in a slightly different
manner as was done in [9]. Each applicant picks his/her first choice post inde-
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pendently and uniformly at random from the set of posts P . We denote the set
of first posts thus picked by all the applicants as L1. If a post in L1 is sought by
more than 1 applicant, then we arbitrarily assign this post to one of the appli-
cants seeking it. So the applicants that do not have a post assigned to them have
to try again in the next round whereas the |L1| applicants who have found posts
do not pick any post in further rounds. So at the end of round 1, we are left with
n− |L1| unmatched posts and n− |L1| unmatched applicants. It is easy to see
that the expected value E[n−|L1|] is
E[n−|L1|] = n(1− 1
n
)n ≤ n
e
.
Each of these n− |L1| unmatched applicants further picks his/her level 2
post independently and uniformly at random from P − L1. This experiment is
identical to the experiment in the first round, except that we are operating with
n−|L1| applicants and n−|L1| posts instead of n applicants and n posts. In round
i, we will have ni applicants and ni posts and each of these applicants picks
his/her level i post independently and uniformly at random from P −{L1∪L2∪
·· · ∪Li−1}. It is easy to see that the expected value of ni is n(1− 1/n)n(i−1) ≤
n/ei−1. Thus at the end of round ⌈lnn⌉ we expect to have no empty posts, that
is, we have a perfect matching.
Note that the number of rounds taken by the above experiment is an upper
bound on the number of rounds taken by our algorithm, since for the simplicity
of analysis, in the above experiment in each round we assigned a post that is
sought by more than one applicant to arbitrarily one of them, whereas in our
algorithm we make no such arbitrary assignment. Thus the number of rounds
taken by our algorithm to find a perfect matching is possibly much lower than
the number of rounds taken by the above experiment to find a perfect matching,
as the experimental results attested. Note that we can also show that the number
of rounds in the above experiment is with high probability c lnn, for a small
constant c, using Azuma’s Inequality.
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